Whether rationality of economic behavior increases with expected payoffs and decreases with the cognitive cost it takes to formulate an optimal strategy remains an open question. We explore these issues with field data, using individual bids from sealed-bid auctions in which we sold nearly $10,000 worth of sportscards. Our results indicate that stakes do indeed matter, as high-priced ($70) cards produced more of the theoretically predicted strategic behavior than did lower-priced ($3) cards. We find additional evidence consistent with the importance of cognitive costs, as subjects more experienced with sportscard auctions exhibited a greater tendency to behave strategically than did less experienced bidders.
Introduction
Positive opportunity costs of mental effort may invalidate the predictions of traditional models of rational (or hyper-rational) agents. Conlisk (1996) uses deliberation costs as a recurring theme when discussing four important reasons for incorporating bounded rationality in economic models. Smith and Walker (1993) and Smith and Szidarovszky (1999) present effort models which predict that individuals' behavior will more closely match the predictions of rational-behavior theories as (1) the stakes of the decision increase, and (2) the decision costs decrease.
1 Smith and Walker (1993) find evidence of these two effects in a comprehensive review of thirty-one published laboratory experiments. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) extend Smith and Walker's survey by examining 74 experimental papers, and find evidence in favor of the cognitive-effort theory, noting that "higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judgment and decision tasks." Although the laboratory evidence is compelling, there has been little verification of these predictions outside the laboratory.
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The present paper fills this gap by examining field data from 164 multi-unit sportscard auctions carried out on the floor of a sportscard show. We auctioned four types of trading cards with book values ranging from $3 to $70, providing significant variation in the stakes of the auction. Our auctions also included two distinct types of subjects: some auctions had sportscard dealers bidding against each other, while others had individual card collectors as the participants. This variation allows us to explore the second dimension of decision-cost theory−do dealers, who commonly participate in sportscard auctions and therefore likely require less effort to bid optimally, bid more rationally than nondealers? Our measure of "rational" bidding comes from multi-unit auction theory, which predicts strategic "demand reduction" in uniform-price auctions.
For each type of bidder and each type of card, we measure this demand-reduction behavior in the uniform-price auction relative to a control (the multi-unit Vickrey auction) where bidders are predicted to fully reveal their demands.
Our sportscard data, generated from sales of 328 sportscards with a combined book value of nearly $10,000, provide two major insights. First, we find that the predicted strategic behavior is considerably greater when the auctioned sportscards have higher values. Second, dealers exhibit more of the predicted strategic behavior than do nondealers, for both lower and higher priced cards. Nondealers may find that the cognitive effort required to bid strategically exceeds the benefits, especially for lowvalued cards. By contrast, dealers have more experience with auctions and make their living by trading cards, so their cognitive costs are likely lower than those of nondealers.
These two findings are consistent with recent theoretical models of monetary rewards and decision costs, and extend previous experimental evidence from the laboratory into the field.
Background on Multi-Unit Auctions
Our experiment examines bidding behavior in sealed-bid auctions for two identical units of a homogeneous good, using two different price rules: uniform-price and generalized Vickrey. A recent wave of theoretical literature has investigated equilibria in uniform-price auctions with multi-unit demand (Noussair (1995) , Katzman (1995) , Tenorio (1997) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) , and Ausubel and Cramton (1997) ). The main result is that in uniform-price auctions, bidders have a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal their demands for the first unit of the good, but they have an incentive to reduce their bids below their valuations for additional units. The incentive is that one's bid on an additional unit might end up determining the price paid for winning a single unit, so a lower bid has some chance of increasing one's consumer surplus. 3 The economic consequences of demand reduction include inefficient allocations and possible reductions in auction revenue.
To avoid the inefficiencies associated with the uniform-price auction, theorists have identified an alternative mechanism, the generalized Vickrey auction, which gives bidders a dominant strategy of revealing their true valuations for all units of the good. In this multi-unit Vickrey auction, as in the uniform-price auction, each bidder can submit up to n different sealed bids on individual units, and the top n bids are declared winners.
If a bidder submits one or more of the winning bids, her price for her first unit equals the highest rejected bid submitted by someone else, and her price for the kth unit equals the kth highest of the rejected bids submitted by others. 4 This is a special case of a GrovesClarke mechanism for dominant-strategy truthtelling.
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For our purposes, this auction literature provides predictions about strategic behavior on which to base a test of cognitive costs and rewards. Theory predicts secondunit bids to be lower in the uniform-price auction than in the Vickrey auction. If deliberation costs are important, we should find that demand reduction in the uniformprice auctions is more prevalent for higher priced cards, as bidders will tend to invest more effort in thinking about the subtle strategic incentives when they stand to gain more from such effort. We have a similar prediction about dealers versus nondealers. Dealers routinely participate in sportscard auctions both to sell and acquire their card stocks, and even though they may never have participated in these particular auction formats, they may exert less cognitive effort to find optimal strategies than nondealers with less prior auction experience of any kind. Since dealers make their living selling cards and typically sell cards for higher prices than nondealers, the monetary rewards to strategic behavior may also be much larger for dealers. Both effects predict more strategic demand reduction for dealers than nondealers.
Data
We use data from a field experiment at a 1998 Orlando trading card show (List and Lucking-Reiley (2000)) to compare outcomes in uniform-price and Vickrey sealedbid auctions, with particular attention paid to the effects of rewards and deliberation costs. We conducted 82 Vickrey and 82 uniform-price auctions. Our participants were of two types: card dealers and nondealers, each bidding against rivals of the same type.
The auctioned sportscards fit into two price categories: low (book value of $3) and high bidders, and identical copies were sold to winning bidders after the auctions concluded.
To perform the simplest possible field experiment, we chose a design with two bidders and two cards per auction. Two bidders were invited to submit two bids each for two identical sportscards, in an auction with no reserve price. We chose the auction format and card type for each subject according to a predetermined schedule, to avoid accidentally introducing experimenter bias. After receipt of bids from a group of subjects within a treatment, we randomly matched pairs of bidders to determine the outcome of each two-person auction. Each participant's experience typically followed four steps: (1) inspection of the good, (2) learning the auction rules, (3) placing two bids, and (4) conclusion of the transaction (usually a couple of hours after step (3)). No subject participated in more than one auction.
6 Table 1 Cal Ripken, Jr. cards to dealers in uniform-price auctions.
Experimental Results
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our bidding data. In List and Lucking-
Reiley (2000), we noted that the data provide evidence of strategic demand reduction−across all five treatments second-unit bids are lower in the uniform-price auctions than in the Vickrey auctions. Here, we push the data somewhat harder, and note that the amount of demand reduction appears to vary both with the stakes of the experiment ($3 versus $70 book values) and with the level of bidder experience (nondealers versus dealers).
Before comparing the strategic behavior across dealers and nondealers, we point out two apparent differences in their underlying demands for cards. First, dealers' demands tend to be situated at a higher level than those of nondealers for the Joe Montana card (book value $3), which was the only card auctioned to both types of bidders. In both Vickrey and uniform-price auctions, and for both first units and second units of the good, mean bids are higher for dealers than for nondealers. Second, dealers' demands also appear to be less steeply sloped. In the Vickrey auction, where bids should equal bidders' true values, we find that dealers value a second unit at $0.77 (or 38%) less than a first unit, on average, while the corresponding decline for nondealers is significantly larger, at $0.90 (or 66%). This second effect also appears in the data for $70 cards, though the comparison is less clean because the cards auctioned to the two groups were not identical. First-unit bids on $70 cards are relatively similar across subject types, but demands are again less steeply sloped for dealers than for nondealers. The mean decline between first and second Vickrey auction bids is $7.83 (16%) for dealers, but $23.00 (44%) for nondealers.
The differences across bidder types appear consistent with dealers having better resale opportunities for cards. Dealers hold inventories of cards that they later sell to individual consumers typically at flat prices−they can usually sell a second copy of a single card at the same price as they sold the first. Dealers also buy cards from individual consumers, typically at prices 40-60% lower than those at which they sell them. By contrast, most consumers collect single copies of individual cards, with little interest in holding multiple copies. Furthermore, a given sportscard consumer might not even desire a single copy of a particular card (e.g., if she already has a copy, or if she does not collect cards of that type). For cards not desired for their collections, nondealers' resale opportunities are much lower than the resale opportunities of dealers. Nondealers might be expected to get lower prices when selling, and would also generally find it more inconvenient (costly) to locate a buyer. 7 Overall, then, we might expect individual consumers to have both lower overall demands and steeper demand curves than dealers, consistent with what we find in the data.
In the subsections below, we discuss our two major results: (1) strategic behavior is much more evident for high-priced than low-priced cards, and (2) strategic behavior is more evident for dealers than for nondealers.
4A. Strategic behavior is evident primarily for high-priced cards
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 provide strong evidence of strategic demand reduction. As the theory predicts, second-unit bids are lower in the uniform-price than in the Vickrey auctions. Mean Vickrey bids exceed mean uniform-price bids by approximately $12 for the high-priced cards, and by only $0.05 to $0.30 for the lowpriced cards.
Figures 1-4 present a graphical depiction of these results. First, consider the data from auctions for $70 cards: Ripken (nondealers) in Figure 1 , and Sanders (nondealers) in Figure 2 . In each case, we note that the distribution of uniform-price bids clearly lies to the left of the distribution of Vickrey bids, which we interpret as strategic demand reduction in the uniform-price auctions. In stark contrast are nondealers' second-unit bids on the $3 cards: Jordan in Figure 3 , and Montana in Figure 4 . In these cases, the Vickrey and uniform-price bid distributions look nearly indistinguishable from each other, though the mean Vickrey bid remains numerically slightly higher than the mean uniform-price bid. However, the differences are statistically significant only for the two high-value cards (Ripken, Sanders), not for the low-value cards (Jordan, Montana).
We conclude that the demand-reduction effect appears larger when the stakes are higher. This is true not only in dollar magnitude, but also relative to the variance of bids (as measured by the t-test). Subjects may have considered the stakes in the $3 card auctions not to be large enough to warrant careful consideration of strategies, and therefore made less than perfectly strategic second-unit bids. 11 This is consistent with the previously cited literature on deliberation costs in laboratory experiments.
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9 We report results of a large-sample test, which requires no distributional assumptions. We are making the large-sample assumption with sample sizes as small as 20; to check robustness we also conducted smallsample t-tests which assume populations have normal distributions and equal variances. The results were never qualitatively different. 10 Further evidence of demand reduction can be obtained by examining the difference between each bidder's first and second-unit bids, a measure of the steepness of each bidder's downward-sloping bid schedule. In each case, the mean difference between first-unit and second-unit bids is much larger in the uniform-price than in the Vickrey auctions. For example, differences between bid one and bid two were $7-$23 in the Vickrey auctions for expensive cards, compared with $30-$45 in the uniform-price auctions. For the low-priced cards, bids differed by $0.80-$0.90 in the Vickrey auctions, and $1.00-$1.50 in the uniform-price auctions. But, we note that one caveat to this differencing approach is that we do not find equality of first-unit bids across auction formats (for high-priced cards). Instead, first-unit bids are larger in the uniform-price auctions than in the corresponding Vickrey auctions. The magnitude of the difference is in the $10 neighborhood for the high-priced ($70) cards, and $0.03 to $0.46 for the low-priced ($3) cards. For further discussion of this anomaly, see List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) . 11 We implicitly assume here that the optimal strategy always involves demand reduction (lower secondbids in the uniform-price auction). Since the theoretically optimal strategy varies with the true distribution of bidder values, this is not necessarily the case. It is possible that because of intrinsic differences in bidder values, some cards should have more demand reduction than others in Nash equilibrium. The true values are not directly observable, but the Vickrey bids should provide a good indication of the true distribution of values.
4B. Strategic behavior increases with experience
We find some evidence for a second prediction of cognitive-cost theory: that strategic behavior is more pronounced when agents have more experience. Since dealers generally have more experience with auctions than nondealers, 13 we examine differences in strategic behavior between dealers and nondealers. We focus here on bidding behavior for the $3 Joe Montana card, the only card bid on by both dealers and nondealers.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate some evidence of dealers behaving more strategically than nondealers. The difference in mean second-unit bids between the Vickrey and uniform-price auctions is $0.32 for dealers (roughly 25% of the mean Vickrey bid), but only $0.05 for nondealers (roughly 10% of the mean Vickrey bid).
Neither amount is significantly different from zero at conventional levels, but for dealers the difference at least begins to approach statistical significance (p = 0.213, two-tailed, versus p = 0.734 for nondealers).
Fortunately for our purposes, the main difference between the shapes of the low-stakes and the high-stakes value distributions is that the low-stakes cards appear to have values skewed towards zero. The theory generally predicts the opposite of what we observe: when values are more concentrated at zero, there should be more strategic demand reduction in uniform-price auctions. Although not proved in general, this claim is substantiated by several examples given by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Ausubel and Cramton (1996) . The intuition for this claim (more demand reduction with lower distributions of values) is that the gains from demand reduction are greater when one's second-unit bid is more likely to actually determine the price, which can only occur when others' bids are sufficiently low. Thus, differences in bid distributions do not appear to be the reason for the observed lessening of demand reduction in our low-stakes experiments. 14 This evidence of a difference between dealers and nondealers, while somewhat noisy, is suggestive that dealers behave more strategically, exhibiting more demand reduction, than nondealers. This finding is consistent with the notion that dealers need to exert less effort than nondealers to place optimal bids.
Concluding Remarks
Recent evidence from the laboratory indicates that predictions of rational models may fail if the cognitive costs of finding optimal strategies are large compared to their expected rewards. We explore this issue in the field by auctioning-off nearly $10,000 worth of sportscards in 164 different auctions. Our results suggest that strategic behavior and expected payoffs are positively correlated. Indeed, bidders exhibited strategic demand-reduction behavior much more for high-priced cards than they did for lowerpriced cards. A second result is that subjects more experienced with sportscard auctions exhibited a greater tendency to engage in demand reduction than did less experienced subjects. The effect of the size of the stakes is much more pronounced than the effect of the bidder type. In particular, we find pronounced evidence of strategic behavior for goods worth around $70. For goods worth around $3, by contrast, we find no evidence of strategic behavior for inexperienced bidders (nondealers), and some weak evidence of strategic behavior for experienced bidders (dealers). The size of the stakes, and to some extent bidder experience, both help to explain when strategic behavior is more likely. 
